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Abstract
We consider a directed network in which every edge possesses a latency function that specifies the
time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion. Selfish, noncooperative agents constitute the
network traffic and wish to travel from a source vertex s to a destination t as quickly as possible.
Since the route chosen by one network user affects the congestion experienced by others, we model
the problem as a noncooperative game. Assuming that each agent controls only a negligible portion
of the overall traffic, Nash equilibria in this noncooperative game correspond to s–t flows in which
all flow paths have equal latency.
A natural measure for the performance of a network used by selfish agents is the common latency
experienced by users in a Nash equilibrium. Braess’s Paradox is the counterintuitive but well-known
fact that removing edges from a network can improve its performance. Braess’s Paradox motivates
the following network design problem: given a network, which edges should be removed to obtain
the best flow at Nash equilibrium? Equivalently, given a network of edges that can be built, which
subnetwork will exhibit the best performance when used selfishly?
We give optimal inapproximability results and approximation algorithms for this network design
problem. For example, we prove that there is no approximation algorithm for this problem with
approximation ratio less than n/2, where n is the number of network vertices, unless P = NP .
We further show that this hardness result is the best possible, by exhibiting an (n/2)-approximation
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is imposed on the network latency functions.
Moreover, we prove that an optimal approximation algorithm for these problems is the trivial
algorithm: given a network of candidate edges, build the entire network. As a consequence, we show
that Braess’s Paradox—even in its worst-possible manifestations—is impossible to detect efficiently.
En route to these results, we give a fundamental generalization of Braess’s Paradox: the improve-
ment in performance that can be effected by removing edges can be arbitrarily large in large networks.
Even though Braess’s Paradox has enjoyed 35 years as a textbook example, our result is the first to
extend its severity beyond that in Braess’s original four-node network.
© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Selfish routing
A central and well-studied problem arising in the management of a large network is that
of routing traffic to achieve the best possible network performance. Recently, researchers
have started to confront the harsh reality that in many networks, it is difficult or even
impossible to impose optimal or near-optimal routing strategies on network traffic, leaving
network users free to act according to their own interests. This realization has led many
researchers, too numerous to list here, to employ classical game theory and model the
behavior of network users with noncooperative games and their Nash equilibria. For a
gentle introduction to basic game-theoretic concepts, see Straffin [103].
Nash equilibria can be inefficient, in the sense that they need not optimize natural global
objective functions [38]. This fact has motivated researchers to propose several different
ways of coping with selfishness—of ensuring that selfish behavior results in a socially
desirable outcome. The previous approaches explored by the theoretical computer science
community for traffic routing problems include bounding the worst-possible inefficiency
of Nash equilibria, also known as the “price of anarchy” [20,29,31,32,68,76,82,91,92,94,
95,108], influencing the behavior of selfish agents via pricing policies [1,21,26,27] and
network switch protocols [99], and routing a small portion of the traffic centrally [64,89].
In this paper, we explore a different idea for ameliorating the degradation in network
performance due to selfish routing: armed with the knowledge that our networks will be
host to selfish users, how can we design them to minimize the inefficiency inherent in a
Nash equilibrium?
1.2. Braess’s Paradox
We will consider a directed network in which each edge possesses a latency function
specifying the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion, and will assume that
all network traffic wishes to travel from a distinguished source vertex s to a destination
vertex t . Selfish, noncooperative agents constitute the network traffic, and each wishes to
travel from s to t as quickly as possible. Since the route chosen by one network user affects
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Fig. 1. Braess’s Paradox. Removing an edge from a network can improve its performance.
the congestion, and hence the latency, experienced by others, it will be useful to view the
problem as a noncooperative game. Assuming each agent controls only a negligible portion
of the overall traffic, an assignment of traffic to paths in the network can be modeled as
fractional network flow, with a Nash equilibrium in the noncooperative game correspond-
ing to an s–t flow in which all flow paths have equal—and minimum-possible—latency.
Informal discussion of this model began in the 1920s [62,86], and the model was rigorously
defined in the 1950s [13,110]. Many more references can be found in [43,79,93,98].
A natural measure for the performance of a network used by selfish agents is the com-
mon latency experienced by each user in a Nash equilibrium, as it navigates from s to t .
Braess’s Paradox is the counterintuitive but well-known fact that removing edges from a
network can improve its performance. We illustrate this phenomenon with a simple exam-
ple, shown in Fig. 1, that is due to Schulman [96] and closely based on Braess’s original
example [15]. In the figure, every edge is labeled with its latency function, which is a func-
tion of the amount of flow x that uses the edge. For example, if there is one half unit of
flow on the edge (s, v), then all of this flow experiences one half unit of latency when
traversing the edge. Now suppose that one unit of flow needs to be routed from s to t in
the network in Fig. 1(a). In the unique flow at Nash equilibrium, all traffic follows the path
s → v → w → t and experiences two units of latency; since the other two s–t paths also
have latency 2 with respect to this flow, no user has an incentive to switch paths. On the
other hand, suppose we remove the edge (v,w), thereby obtaining the network in Fig. 1(b).
Then, in the unique flow at Nash equilibrium, half of the flow travels on each of the two
paths, and all agents experience 3/2 units of latency.
1.3. Network design
Braess’s Paradox immediately suggests the following network design problem: given
a network with latency functions on the edges and a traffic rate, which edges should be
removed to obtain the best possible flow at Nash equilibrium? Equivalently, given a large
network of candidate edges to build, which subnetwork will exhibit the best performance
when used selfishly?
This problem is fundamentally different from most network design problems that have
been studied by the theoretical computer science community, such as those described in
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such as high connectivity or small diameter. Problems of this sort are only non-trivial in
the presence of non-zero costs on vertices and/or edges—otherwise, the best solution is
simply to build the largest possible network. Braess’s Paradox shows that this approach
is suboptimal for our network design problem: there are no costs, yet it is not at all clear
which network should be preferred.
Ever since Braess’s Paradox was reported [15,78], researchers have attempted to solve
variants of this network design problem (e.g., [34]), but scant progress has been made
either computationally or theoretically. Indeed, early computational work either focused
on very small networks [69] or admitted to ignoring congestion effects entirely, due to the
difficulties involved [14,36,54,88,97,113]. In a 1984 survey, Magnanti and Wong describe
the problem as “essentially unsolved” from a practical perspective [74, p. 15].
On the theoretical side, all existing work on the network design problem that we study
and on the problem of detecting Braess’s Paradox either exclusively considers the four-
node network of Fig. 1(a) [45,56,83,84] or other very special classes of networks [46],
or focuses entirely on the special case where only one edge is to be added or deleted
from the network [33,102,104]. Since the latency of traffic at Nash equilibrium can be
computed in polynomial time (see [93]), restricting attention to single edge removals yields
an algorithmically trivial problem, which can be solved in polynomial time by enumerating
all possible solutions. In our network design problem, any subset of edges can be removed,
and there can thus be exponentially many candidate solutions. The network design problem
also becomes easier if the goal is to determine whether a graph, unadorned with latency
functions, is vulnerable to Braess’s Paradox in the sense that some assignment of latency
functions to edges causes Braess’s Paradox to arise [77,78]. In our version of the problem,
a network is given with latency functions already attached. Finally, a recent series of papers
[4,39,65,66,70] studies a similar network design problem in capacitated networks, of how
to allocate a fixed amount of capacity to edges to obtain the largest possible improvement
in the Nash equilibrium. These papers either confine themselves to networks of parallel
links or provide only sufficient, and far from necessary, conditions for a given capacity
allocation to improve network performance. They are therefore not directly relevant for
our network design problem.
Very recently, the network design problem described in this paper has received attention
from the theoretical computer science community, and several researchers have asked if
there are efficient exact or near-optimal algorithms for the problem.
Designing networks for selfish users has thus appeared difficult from a range of per-
spectives and to several research communities. In this paper, we present a theoretical
explanation for this perceived difficulty.
1.4. Our results: network design
We give optimal inapproximability results and approximation algorithms for several
network design problems of the following type: given a network with edge latency func-
tions, a single source-sink pair, and a rate of traffic, find the subnetwork minimizing the
latency of all (selfish) network users in a flow at Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we prove
the following for every  > 0, assuming P = NP :
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negative, non-decreasing edge latency functions, there is no (n/2−)-approximation
algorithm2 for network design, where n is the number of vertices in the network.
We also prove that this hardness result is the best possible by exhibiting an n/2-
approximation algorithm for the problem.
– LINEAR LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN: For networks in which the latency of each
edge is a linear function of the congestion, there is no ( 43 −)-approximation algorithm
for network design. The existence of a 43 -approximation algorithm follows easily from
existing work, which proves that this hardness result is optimal.
These problems were not previously known to be NP-hard, and no finite approxi-
mation ratio for GENERAL LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN was previously known. Our
hardness proofs do not require the machinery of probabilistically checkable proofs (see,
e.g., [8,9,41]), and are direct “gap” reductions from well-known NP-complete problems.
Moreover, we prove that an optimal approximation algorithm for these problems is what
we call the trivial algorithm: given a network of candidate edges, build the entire net-
work. As a consequence of the optimality of the trivial algorithm, we prove that Braess’s
Paradox—the presence of harmful extraneous edges—is impossible to detect efficiently,
even in its worst-possible manifestations.
Finally, we show that our strong hardness results are not particular to the classes of
general and linear latency functions. Rather, for additional classes of latency functions,
such as polynomials of bounded degree, the trivial algorithm achieves the best possible
performance guarantee (up to a constant factor).
1.5. Our results: Braess’s Paradox
Braess’s Paradox has intrigued researchers ever since its discovery over 35 years ago
[15], appearing frequently in textbooks [30,48,67,80,81,98] and the popular science litera-
ture [7,10,11,22,63,85]. In addition, Braess’s Paradox has spawned many further research
developments. It has catalyzed the search for other “paradoxes” in traffic networks [6,19,
35,42,52,57,58,60,100,101,109,114] and for analogues of Braess’s Paradox in queueing
networks [18,24,25,112] as well as in seemingly unrelated contexts [12,17,23,59]. It has
renewed interest in the older “Downs–Thomson paradox” [16,37,107]. It has even stirred
debate over its implications for classical philosophical problems [55,75].
Despite this storied history, it was not previously known whether Braess’s Paradox could
be more severe than it is in Braess’s original network [15,96]. En route to proving our
strongest inapproximability result, we resolve this open question in the affirmative. In fact,
we do so in a very strong way: there is an infinite family of networks that demonstrates
that Braess’s Paradox can be arbitrarily severe. Moreover, we prove that our construction
is in some sense the best possible.
2 A c-approximation algorithm for a minimization problem runs in polynomial time and returns a solution
no more than c times as costly as an optimal solution. The value c is the approximation ratio or performance
guarantee of the algorithm.
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In Section 2 we formally define our model, review several of its important properties,
and prove some preliminary results needed in subsequent sections. In Sections 3–5, we
prove matching upper and lower bounds on the best achievable approximation ratio for
network design for several classes of edge latency functions. Linear latency functions are
considered in Section 3. We consider networks with arbitrary latency functions in Sec-
tion 4. We also give our construction of an arbitrarily severe Braess’s Paradox in this
section. In Section 5 we extend our inapproximability results to other classes of latency
functions, including degree-bounded polynomials.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. The model
We consider a directed network G = (V ,E) with vertex set V , edge set E, and a dis-
tinguished source vertex s and sink vertex t . We allow multiple edges between vertices but
have no use for self-loops. We denote the set of (simple) s–t paths by P , which we assume
is non-empty. A flow is a function f :P →R+. A flow induces a flow on edges {fe}e∈E
with fe =∑P : e∈P fP the amount of flow on edge e. While a flow induces a unique flow
on edges, a flow on edges can correspond to many different flows (on paths). With respect
to a finite and positive traffic rate r , a flow f is said to be feasible if ∑P∈P fP = r . Each
edge e ∈ E possesses a congestion-dependent latency that we denote by e(·). The latency
of a path P with respect to a flow f is then the sum of the latencies of the edges in the
path, denoted by P (f ) =∑e∈P e(fe). For each edge e ∈ E, we assume that the latency
function e is non-negative, continuous, and non-decreasing. We call the triple (G, r, ) an
instance.
2.2. Flows at Nash equilibrium
We will consider flows that represent an equilibrium among many noncooperative
agents—flows that behave in a “greedy” or “selfish” manner. Intuitively, we expect each
unit of such a flow, no matter how small, to travel along the minimum-latency path avail-
able to it, where latency is measured with respect to the rest of the flow. If this condition
failed, then this flow would reroute itself on a path with smaller latency. Following [34,94],
we formalize this idea in the next definition.
Definition 2.1. A flow f feasible for (G, r, ) is at Nash equilibrium, or is a Nash flow, if
for all P1,P2 ∈ P with fP1 > 0 and δ ∈ (0, fP1], we have
P1(f ) P2(f˜ ),
where
f˜P =
{
fP − δ if P = P1,
fP + δ if P = P2,
fP otherwise.
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the following useful characterization of a flow at Nash equilibrium, first stated by
Wardrop [110].
Proposition 2.2. A flow f feasible for (G, r, ) is at Nash equilibrium if and only if for
every P1,P2 ∈ P with fP1 > 0,
P1(f ) P2(f ).
In particular, if f is at Nash equilibrium then all of the s–t paths to which f assigns a
positive amount of flow have equal latency.
The following proposition states that, under our assumption of continuous, non-
decreasing edge latency functions, flows at Nash equilibrium always exist and are essen-
tially unique.
Proposition 2.3. Every instance (G, r, ) admits a flow at Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if
f,f ′ are Nash flows for (G, r, ), then P (f ) = P (f ′) for every s–t path P .
Proposition 2.3 is due to Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten [13], and proofs can also
be found in [15,34,94]. These proofs of Proposition 2.3 show that the Nash flows of an
instance are precisely the optimal solutions of a particular convex program. The objective
function that is minimized in this convex program is a non-decreasing function of the
induced flow on edges, and is independent of the particular flow decomposition. Every
Nash flow can therefore be made acyclic, by removing flow cycles from its induced flow
on edges and then taking an arbitrary path decomposition.
Proposition 2.4. Every instance (G, r, ) admits a flow f at Nash equilibrium with the
property that the subgraph of G of edges for which fe > 0 is directed acyclic.
2.3. Formalizing the network design problem
Let L(G, r, ) be the common latency of every s–t flow path of a flow f at Nash equilib-
rium for (G, r, ). The value L(G, r, ) is well defined by Propositions 2.2 and 2.3. When
no confusion results, we will abbreviate the expression L(G, r, ) by L(G).
We may thus formally state our network design problem as follows:
Given an instance (G, r, ), find a subgraph H of G that minimizes L(H, r, ).
Since the value L(H, r, ) can be recovered from the subgraph H in polynomial time
via convex programming (see [93]), we can view this problem as purely combinatorial.
Remark 2.5. Strictly speaking, to talk about “polynomial-time algorithms,” we need to pre-
scribe how instances are encoded for input to a (mathematical model of a) computer. This
is not a trivial problem, since in our exposition we are permitting network latency functions
to be arbitrary continuous, non-decreasing functions. Nonetheless, these and similar issues
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reader with a detailed discussion of this point. Suffice it to say that our results hold with any
reasonable encoding method. For example, all of our hardness results hold even if latency
functions are restricted to be piecewise linear with a constant number of breakpoints.
2.4. The cost of a flow
Our next preliminary result relates our objective function L(H, r, ) to a second objec-
tive function that has been well studied. This connection will be crucial for proving upper
bounds on the performance guarantee of the trivial algorithm in Sections 3 and 5.
Definition 2.6. The cost C(f ) of a flow f feasible for (G, r, ) is the total latency incurred
by f :
C(f ) =
∑
P∈P
P (f )fP .
We immediately see that the cost of a flow at Nash equilibrium can be written in a
particularly nice form.
Proposition 2.7. If f is a flow at Nash equilibrium for (G, r, ), then
C(f ) = r ·L(G, r, ).
2.5. Properties of Nash flows
In this subsection we note two useful properties of Nash flows. The first states that
L(G, r, ) is non-decreasing in the traffic rate r , when the graph G and latency functions 
are fixed. We will use this result in Subsection 5.1.
Proposition 2.8. For every instance (G, r, ), L(G, r, ) is a non-decreasing function of r .
Proposition 2.8 was first established by Hall [53]. For a combinatorial proof, see Lin,
Roughgarden, and Tardos [72].
Next, we will show that a certain type of vertex ordering exists relative to a directed
acyclic Nash flow. Such orderings will be an important tool in Subsection 4.1.
Definition 2.9. Let f be a Nash flow for the instance (G, r, ). Let d(v) denote the length
of a shortest s–v path with respect to the edge lengths {e(fe)}e∈E . An ordering of the
vertices of G is f -monotone if it satisfies the following two properties:
(P1) All f -flow travels forward in the ordering.
(P2) The d-values of vertices are non-decreasing in the ordering.
We will show that properties (P1) and (P2) are compatible, in the sense that an f -mon-
otone ordering exists relative to a directed acyclic Nash flow. To prove this, we require the
following alternative definition of Nash flows.
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the length, with respect to edge lengths {e(fe)}e∈E , of a shortest s–v path in G. Then f
is at Nash equilibrium if and only if
d(w)− d(v) e(fe) (1)
for all edges e = (v,w), with equality holding whenever fe > 0.
Proof. First, we note that (1)—the “triangle inequality”—holds for every flow f by the
definition of the shortest path labels d . Thus, for an s–t path P ∈P , we can write
P (f ) =
∑
e∈P
e(fe)
∑
e=(v,w)∈P
d(w)− d(v) = d(t)− d(s) = d(t). (2)
By the definition of d(t), a path P is minimum-latency with respect to f if and only if
P (f ) = d(t). This occurs if and only if equality holds in (2), which in turn is true if and
only if d(w) − d(v) = e(fe) for all edges e of P . The proposition now follows from
Proposition 2.2. 
We can now prove that an f -monotone ordering exists relative to a directed acyclic
Nash flow f .
Proposition 2.11. If f is a directed acyclic Nash flow for the instance (G, r, ), then there
is an f -monotone ordering of the vertices of G.
Proof. First, topologically sort the vertices of G according to the directed acyclic flow
f to ensure property (P1) of Definition 2.9. Define distance labels d as in Definition 2.9.
An ordered pair (u, v) of vertices is bad if d(v) < d(u) in spite of v following u in the
ordering. Property (P2) of Definition 2.9 is equivalent to the absence of bad vertex pairs.
If there is a bad vertex pair, there is one such pair (u, v) with u and v adjacent in the
ordering. By Proposition 2.10 and the non-negativity of latency functions, d-values cannot
decrease across an edge e with fe > 0. Hence, there is no flow-carrying edge from u to v.
Transposing u and v therefore does not violate property (P1) of Definition 2.9 and strictly
decreases the number of bad vertex pairs. Finitely many such transpositions must therefore
yield an f -monotone ordering. 
3. Linear latency functions
We begin with networks in which the latency of every edge is a linear function of the
congestion, so that each latency function e can be written e(x) = aex +be for ae, be  0.
This is a commonly studied scenario [34,45–47,83,84,94,101,102], and our proof of inap-
proximability is particularly simple in this case.
Recall that the trivial algorithm, when presented with an instance (G, r, ), outputs the
entire network G. We begin by observing that the trivial algorithm is a 43 -approximation
algorithm for LINEAR LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN. This will follow easily from a result
of Roughgarden and Tardos [94]. The result states that in every network with linear latency
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feasible flow.
Proposition 3.1. [94] Let f ∗ and f be feasible and Nash flows, respectively, for an instance
(G, r, ) with linear latency functions. Then,
C(f ) 4
3
·C(f ∗).
Corollary 3.2. The trivial algorithm is a 43 -approximation algorithm for LINEAR LA-
TENCY NETWORK DESIGN.
Proof. Consider an instance (G, r, ) with linear latency functions, with subgraph H
minimizing L(H, r, ). Let f and f ∗ denote flows at Nash equilibrium for (G, r, )
and (H, r, ), respectively. By Proposition 2.7, we can write C(f ) = r · L(G, r, ) and
C(f ∗) = r · L(H, r, ). Since f ∗ can be viewed as a feasible flow for (G, r, ), Proposi-
tion 3.1 implies that C(f ) 43C(f ∗) and hence L(G, r, )
4
3L(H, r, ). 
The main result of this section is that, unless P = NP , no better approximation is
possible in polynomial time.
Theorem 3.3. Assuming P = NP , for every  > 0 there is no ( 43 − )-approximation
algorithm for LINEAR LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN.
Proof. Our reduction will be from the problem 2 DIRECTED DISJOINT PATHS (2DDP):
given a directed graph G = (V ,E) and distinct vertices s1, s2, t1, t2 ∈ V , are there si–ti
paths Pi for i = 1,2, such that P1 and P2 are vertex-disjoint? Fortune, Hopcroft, and Wyllie
[44] proved that this problem is NP-complete. We will show that a ( 43 − )-approximation
algorithm for LINEAR LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN can be used to distinguish “yes” and
“no” instances of 2DDP in polynomial time.
Consider an instance I of 2DDP, as above. Augment the vertex set V by an additional
source s and sink t , and include directed edges (s, s1), (s, s2), (t1, t), and (t2, t), see Fig. 2.
Denote the new network by G′ = (V ′,E′) and endow the edges of E′ with the following
linear latency functions : edges of E are given the latency function (x) = 0, edges (s, s2)
and (t1, t) are given the latency function (x) = x, and edges (s, s1) and (t2, t) are given the
Fig. 2. Proof of Theorem 3.3. In a “no” instance of 2DDP, the existence of s1–t1 and s2–t2 paths implies the
existence of an s2–t1 path.
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To complete the proof, it suffices to show the following two statements:
(i) If I is a “yes” instance of 2DDP, then G′ admits a subgraph H with L(H,1, ) = 3/2.
(ii) If I is a “no” instance, then L(H,1, ) 2 for all subgraphs H of G′.
To prove (i), let P1 and P2 be vertex-disjoint s1–t1 and s2–t2 paths in G, respec-
tively, and obtain H by deleting all edges of G not contained in some Pi . Then, H is
a subgraph of G′ with exactly two s–t paths, and routing half a unit of flow along each
yields a flow at Nash equilibrium for (H,1, ) in which each path has latency 3/2 (cf.
Fig. 1(b)).
For (ii), we may assume that H contains an s–t path. If H has an s–t path P containing
an s2–t1 path, then routing all of the flow on P yields a Nash flow in which every s–t
path has latency 2 (cf. Fig. 1(a)). Hence, L(H) = 2 for all such subgraphs H . Otherwise,
since I is a “no” instance of 2DDP, two sole possibilities remain (see Fig. 2): either for
precisely one i ∈ {1,2}, H has an s–t path P containing an si–ti path, or all s–t paths P
in H contain an s1–t2 path of G. In either case, routing one unit of flow along such a path
P provides a flow at Nash equilibrium showing that L(H) = 2. 
Corollary 3.2 and Theorem 3.3 imply that efficiently detecting Braess’s Paradox in net-
works with linear latency functions is impossible, even in instances suffering from the
most severe manifestations of the paradox. To make this statement precise, call an in-
stance (G, r, ) with linear latency functions paradox-free if L(G, r, )  L(H, r, ) for
all subgraphs H of G, and paradox-ridden if for some subgraph H of G, L(G, r, ) =
4
3L(H, r, ). Paradox-free instances do not suffer from Braess’s Paradox and, by Corol-
lary 3.2, paradox-ridden instances are precisely those incurring a worst-possible loss in
network performance due to Braess’s Paradox. The reduction in the proof of Theorem 3.3
then gives the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4. Given an instance (G, r, ) that has linear latency functions and is ei-
ther paradox-free or paradox-ridden, it is NP-hard to decide whether or not (G, r, ) is
paradox-ridden.
4. General latency functions
In this section we study network design with general (continuous, non-decreasing)
latency functions. Previous work offers no aid in upper or lower bounding the best approx-
imation ratio that can be obtained for this problem; we will introduce new proof techniques
for each of our two (matching) bounds.
In Subsection 4.1, we use the monotone orderings of Subsection 2.5 to prove that
the trivial algorithm achieves an approximation ratio of n/2, where n is the number
of vertices in the network. In Subsection 4.2, we show a matching lower bound on the
performance guarantee of the trivial algorithm. We accomplish this by giving the first net-
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works that demonstrate that Braess’s Paradox can be more severe in larger networks than
in Braess’s original four-node example [15]. In Subsection 4.3, we use this family of net-
works to prove an optimal hardness result that matches the performance guarantee of the
trivial algorithm.
4.1. An n/2-approximation algorithm
Our next goal is to prove that the trivial algorithm is an n/2-approximation algorithm
for GENERAL LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN, where n is the number of vertices in the
network. Before embarking on the proof, we discuss why this result is not trivial, and
does not trivially follow from existing work. In the proof of Corollary 3.2, we saw that an
upper bound on the cost of a Nash flow, relative to all other feasible flows, immediately
yields an identical upper bound on the approximation ratio of the trivial algorithm. Thus,
if we knew that the cost of a Nash flow in a network with n vertices and general latency
functions must be at most n/2 times that of every other feasible flow, then we would
be done.3 Unfortunately, this statement is false, even with n/2 replaced by an arbitrarily
large function of the network size. To see why, we recapitulate an example from [94].
Example 4.1. We will consider the network shown in Fig. 3, with vertices s and t and
two edges. The upper and lower edges have latency functions (x) = 1 and (x) = xp ,
respectively, where p is a large integer.
Setting the traffic rate r to 1, the Nash flow routes all traffic on the lower edge and incurs
one unit of cost. On the other hand, routing  units of flow on the upper edge and the rest
on the lower edge yields a feasible flow that has near-zero cost when p is sufficiently large
and  is sufficiently small.
Example 4.1 shows that in networks with general latency functions, a Nash flow can
be arbitrarily more costly than other feasible flows. Moreover, this remains true in a fixed
network, even in one with only two nodes and two edges.
However, Example 4.1 is not due cause for abandoning the goal of proving some kind
of performance guarantee for the trivial algorithm; it merely indicates that a more delicate
approach is required. In Example 4.1, the flow with near-zero cost was far from at equi-
librium: a few martyrs were routed on the upper edge for the benefit of the overwhelming
3 Indeed, this argument will reoccur in Section 5.
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majority of the flow. Indeed, for all non-empty subgraphs H of G, L(H) = 1. Every non-
trivial subgraph of G provides an optimal solution to our network design problem, but we
cannot prove any finite approximation ratio based on a comparison with arbitrary feasible
flows.
We have therefore set the bar unduly high. By comparing the output of the trivial algo-
rithm only to feasible flows at equilibrium in a subgraph of G, rather than to all feasible
flows, we will obtain the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 4.2. For every instance (G, r, ) with n vertices, the trivial algorithm returns a
solution of value at most n/2 times that of an optimal solution.
Proof. Let (G, r, ) be an instance in which G has n vertices. By Proposition 2.4, there is
a directed acyclic flow f at Nash equilibrium for (G, r, ). Let H be an arbitrary subgraph
of G and f ∗ a Nash flow for (H, r, ). Let d and d∗ be the distance labels of Definition 2.9
corresponding to the Nash flows f and f ∗ for the instances (G, r, ) and (H, r, ), respec-
tively. Let L∗ be shorthand for L(H, r, ) = d∗(t). We need to show that
d(t)
⌊n
2
⌋
·L∗. (3)
By Proposition 2.11, there is an f -monotone ordering of the vertices of G. Label these
vertices v1, v2, . . . , vn, accordingly. We can assume that v1 = s. Call an edge e of G light
if fe  f ∗e with f ∗e > 0, and heavy otherwise. We can finish the proof by establishing the
following two claims; see also Fig. 4:
(C1) If vj precedes t in the f -monotone ordering, then there is a path of light edges
beginning in {v1, v2, . . . , vj } and terminating in {t, vj+2, vj+3, . . . , vn}.
(C2) If there is a path of light edges from u to v, then d(v) d(u)+L∗.
To see why these two claims imply (3), we first recall that property (P2) from Def-
inition 2.9 states that d-values are non-decreasing in the f -monotone ordering. Since
d(v1) = d(s) = 0, we can apply (C1) and (C2) inductively to the sets {v1, . . . , v2i+1} to
obtain d(v2i+1)  i · L∗ for v2i+1 equal to or preceding t . If t = v2i+1 for an integer i,
then (3) follows immediately. If t = v2i , then d(v2i−1) (i − 1) ·L∗ and (3) follows from
one further application of the two claims to {v1, . . . , v2i−1}.
To prove claim (C1), let vj precede t in the f -monotone ordering. Let S be the s–t
cut {v1, . . . , vj }. Adding up the flow conservation constraints for vertices in S implies
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Lemma 8.1] for further details. Also, by property (P1) of Definition 2.9, no f -flow en-
ters S. At least one light edge must therefore escape S. If some such edge has its head in
{t, vj+2, . . . , vn}, we are done. If not, all light edges terminate at a vertex vj+1 that pre-
cedes t in the f -monotone ordering. By the above argument, some light edge e escapes
{v1, . . . , vj+1}. Since all light edges emanating from S are assumed to end at vj+1, the
edge e must begin at vj+1. Thus, its concatenation with any light edge escaping S provides
the desired path of light edges.
For claim (C2), let P be a path of light edges from u to v. By the definition of light
and the monotonicity of latency functions, e(fe)  e(f ∗e ) for each edge e in P . By the
triangle inequality for shortest-path distances (see (2)), we have
d(v)− d(u)
∑
e∈P
e(fe)
∑
e∈P
e
(
f ∗e
)
.
Since f ∗e > 0 on all edges e of P , Proposition 2.10 implies that
d(v)− d(u)
∑
e∈P
e
(
f ∗e
)= d∗(v)− d∗(u).
Similarly, by Proposition 2.10,
0 d∗(u) d∗(v) L∗.
Hence, d(v) − d(u) d∗(v) − d∗(u) L∗. This completes the proofs of claim (C2) and
the theorem. 
Remark 4.3. The special case of Theorem 4.2 for four-node networks was independently
obtained by Kameda [56].
4.2. The Braess graphs
In this subsection we will show that the bound of n/2 in Theorem 4.2 is tight for all
n  2. This is tantamount to giving a sequence of instances, in which the nth instance is
a network with n vertices such that removing edges can decrease the latency of traffic in
a Nash flow by an n/2 factor. Prior to this work, it was not known if removing edges in
arbitrarily large networks could improve the latency of traffic in a Nash flow by more than
a factor of 2.
For a positive integer k, we define the kth Braess graph. We start with a set V k =
{s, v1, . . . , vk,w1, . . . ,wk, t} of 2k + 2 vertices. The edge set Ek is the union of three
sets, {(s, vi), (vi,wi), (wi, t): 1 i  k}, {(vi,wi−1): 2 i  k}, and {(v1, t)} ∪ {(s,wk)}
(see Fig. 5). We note that B1 is the graph in which Braess’s Paradox was first discovered
(Fig. 1(a)).
We next define latency functions k for the edges of Bk ; these functions will prove
useful in Proposition 4.4 below. See also Fig. 5.
(A) Edges of the form e = (vi,wi) are given the latency function ke(x) = 0.
(B) For an edge e of the form (vi,wi−1), (s,wk), or (v1, t), put ke(x) = 1.
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Fig. 5. The second and third Braess graphs. Edges are labeled with their type.
(C) For each i ∈ {1,2, . . . , k}, the edges (wi, t) and (s, vk−i+1) each receive a continuous,
non-decreasing latency function ke(x) with ke(k/(k + 1)) = 0 and ke(1) = i.
We will call edges of the form (vi,wi) type A edges, and so forth. The latency functions of
type C edges can be defined arbitrarily, except for at the two specified points.
We can now show that the Braess graphs are the promised family of instances in which
Braess’s Paradox can be arbitrarily severe, or equivalently on which the trivial algorithm
performs badly.
Proposition 4.4. For every integer n  2, there is an instance (G, r, ) in which G has n
vertices and a subgraph H with
L(G, r, ) =
⌊
n
2
⌋
·L(H, r, ).
Proof. We can assume that n is even, since the odd case can be reduced to the even case
by adding an isolated vertex. We can also assume that n is at least 4. Write n = 2k + 2 for
a positive integer k and consider the instance (Bk, k, k). For i = 1, . . . , k, let Pi denote
the path s → vi → wi → t . For i = 2, . . . , k, let Qi denote the path s → vi → wi−1 → t .
Define Q1 to be the path s → v1 → t and Qk+1 the path s → wk → t . On one hand, routing
one unit of flow on each of P1, . . . ,Pk yields a flow at Nash equilibrium for (Bk, k, k)
demonstrating that L(Bk, k, k) = k+1 (Fig. 6(a)). On the other hand, if H is the subgraph
obtained from Bk by deleting the k type A edges, then routing k/(k + 1) units of flow
on each of Q1, . . . ,Qk+1 yields a flow at Nash equilibrium for (H, k, k) showing that
L(H,k, k) = 1 (Fig. 6(b)). Thus, L(G)/L(H) = k + 1 = n/2, completing the proof. 
Corollary 4.5. For every integer n  2, there is an instance (G, r, ) in which G has n
vertices and for which the trivial algorithm produces a solution with value n/2 times
that of an optimal solution.
Remark 4.6. Proposition 4.4 was previously known only for networks with at most four
nodes [56,96].
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Fig. 6. Proof of Proposition 4.4, when k = 3. Solid edges carry flow in the flow at Nash equilibrium, dashed edges
do not. Edge latencies are with respect to flows at Nash equilibrium.
Remark 4.7. In the proof of Proposition 4.4, we removed k edges from (Bk, k, k) to
decrease the latency encountered by traffic in a Nash flow by a factor of k + 1. Braess
[15] removed but a single edge in his seminal example. Recently, Lin, Roughgarden, and
Tardos [72] demonstrated the necessity of removing multiple edges, in the following sense:
for all k  1, the only way to decrease the latency of traffic in a Nash flow by a factor strictly
larger than k is to remove at least k edges from the network.
4.3. Proof of hardness
We now show that the trivial algorithm is the best-possible approximation algorithm for
GENERAL LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN, in the sense that no (n/2− )-approximation
algorithm exists, assuming P = NP . We begin with an informal description of the re-
duction. Recall that in an instance of the NP-complete problem PARTITION, we are
given p positive integers {a1, a2, . . . , ap} and seek a subset S ⊆ {1,2, . . . , p} such that∑
j∈S aj = 12
∑p
j=1 aj [49, SP12]. The idea of the reduction is to start with a Braess graph,
and to replace each type A edge with a collection of parallel edges representing an instance
I = {a1, . . . , ap} of PARTITION. We will endow these edges with latency functions that
simulate “capacities,” with an edge representing an integer aj of I receiving capacity aj .
We will then formalize the following three ideas. First, if too many edges are removed
from the network, there will be insufficient remaining capacity to send flow cheaply. On
the other hand, if too few edges are removed, the excess of capacity results in a Nash equi-
librium similar to that of Fig. 6(a). Finally, these two cases can be avoided if and only if
I is a “yes” instance of PARTITION, in which case removing the appropriate collection of
edges results in a network that admits a Nash equilibrium similar to that of Fig. 6(b).
Theorem 4.8. Assuming P = NP , for every  > 0 there is no (n/2 − )-approximation
algorithm for GENERAL LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN.
Proof. We prove that for every fixed n  2, there is no (n/2 − )-approximation al-
gorithm for GENERAL LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN restricted to (multi)graphs with n
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Fix n  2. As in the proof of Proposition 4.4, we can assume that n is even and at
least four. Write n = 2k + 2 for a positive integer k. Consider an instance I = {aj }pj=1 of
PARTITION, with each aj a positive integer. By scaling, we can assume that every aj is a
multiple of 3. Put A =∑pj=1 aj . We will be interested in the traffic rate
r = kA
2
+ k + 1. (4)
Construct a graph G from the kth Braess graph Bk by replacing each edge of the form
(vi,wi) by p parallel edges, and denote these by e1i , e
2
i , . . . , e
p
i .
We now specify the edge latency functions , which are more complicated than in the
previous subsection. We will require a sufficiently small constant δ and a sufficiently large
constant M . The following proof will be valid if we take δ = 1/A(p + k) and M = n/2.
The constant M should be interpreted as a substitute for +∞, and is used to penalize a
flow for violating an edge capacity constraint. We require the constant δ to transform step
functions—the type of function that would be most convenient for our argument—into
continuous functions, the type of function allowed in our model. The parameter δ provides
a small window in which to “smooth out” the discontinuities of a step function. We now
define the latency functions:
(A) An edge of the form eji is given a latency function  with (x) = 0 for x  aj − δ,
(aj ) = 1, and (x) = M for x  aj + δ.
(B) Edges of the form (vi,wi−1), (s,wk), or (v1, t) receive a latency function  satisfying
(x) = 1 for x  1 and (x) = M for x  1 + δ.
(C) For each i ∈ {1,2, . . . , k}, the two edges (wi, t) and (s, vk−i+1) are given a latency
function  satisfying (x) = 0 for x A/2 + 1, (x) = i when x = A/2 + (k + 1)/k,
and (x) = M for x A/2 + (k + 1)/k + δ.
As usual, these latency functions can be defined arbitrarily outside of the regions that we
have prescribed, subject to the usual continuity and monotonicity constraints. The instance
(G, r, ) can be constructed in time polynomial in the size of the PARTITION instance I .
We will say that an edge of the form eji has capacity aj , while edges of type B and C
have capacity 1 and A/2 + (k + 1)/k, respectively. We will call an edge oversaturated by
a flow if the amount of flow on it exceeds its capacity be at least an additive factor of δ. An
oversaturated edge therefore has latency M .
Analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.3, it suffices to prove the following two statements:
(i) If I is a “yes” instance of PARTITION, then G admits a subgraph H with L(H, r, ) = 1.
(ii) If I is a “no” instance, then L(H, r, ) n/2 for every subgraph H of G.
To prove (i), suppose that I admits a partition, and reindex the aj ’s so that
∑m
j=1 aj =
A/2 for some m ∈ {1,2, . . . , p − 1}. Obtain H from G by deleting all edges of the form
e
j for j > m. For each i = 1, . . . , k, the remaining edges of the form ej have total capacityi i
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Fig. 7. Proof of Theorem 4.8. Solid edges carry flow in the flow at Nash equilibrium, dashed edges do not. Edge
latencies are with respect to flows at Nash equilibrium.
A/2. Define the paths Q1, . . . ,Qk+1 as in the proof of Proposition 4.4: for i = 2, . . . , k,
Qi denotes the path s → vi → wi−1 → t , Q1 is the path s → v1 → t , and Qk+1 is the path
s → wk → t . Define a feasible flow f as follows: for each i = 1, . . . , k and j = 1, . . . ,m,
route aj units of flow on the unique path containing edge eji , and route 1 unit of flow on the
path Qi for i = 1,2, . . . , k + 1. The flow f is at Nash equilibrium for (H, r, ) and proves
that L(H, r, ) = 1 (see Fig. 7(a)).
Statement (ii) is more difficult. We first recall that if a flow oversaturates an edge, then
the edge has latency M . A simple but crucial observation is that if a Nash flow in the
instance (H, r, ) oversaturates an edge, then L(H, r, )M  n/2. We will prove (ii) in
two steps. First, we will identify two sufficient conditions on the subgraph H that ensure
that a Nash flow in (H, r, ) must oversaturate some edge and hence L(H, r, )  n/2.
Then, we will give a separate argument that L(H, r, ) n/2 for subgraphs H that do not
meet these sufficient conditions.
We first claim that if a subgraph H omits some type C edge, then a Nash flow in (H, r, )
must oversaturate an edge. To see why, we observe that if H omits a type C edge incident
to s, then the remaining capacity on edges incident to s is at most that of one type B edge
and k − 1 type C edges, which is
1 + (k − 1)
(
1
2
A+ k + 1
k
)
< (k − 1)A
2
+ k + 1. (5)
Since the right-hand side of (5) is at most the traffic rate (4), every feasible flow in (H, r, )
must oversaturate some edge incident to s, provided δ is sufficiently small. The same ar-
gument shows that if H omits a type C edge incident to t , then every feasible flow for
(H, r, ) oversaturates some edge.
Next, we claim that if for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the total capacity Ai of edges of the form
e
j
i in H is less than A/2, then every feasible flow in (H, r, ) oversaturates an edge. To see
this, suppose Ai < A/2. Since all aj ’s are multiples of 3, we must then have Ai A/2−3.
Besides edges of the form eji , the only edge leaving the vertex vi is the unit-capacity type B
edge (vi,wi−1) (or (v1, t), if i = 1). The total capacity out of the vertex vi is therefore at
most A/2 − 2. This in turn gives the edge (s, vi) an “effective capacity” of A/2 − 2, in the
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edge out of vi . The effective capacity of edges incident to s is thus only A/2−2 more than
in the calculation in (5), which is at most
k
A
2
+ k − 1 = r − 2.
As in the previous paragraph, for δ sufficiently small, every feasible flow in (H, r, ) must
oversaturate some edge.
Finally, suppose that the subgraph H contains all type C edges and that the total capacity
Ai of edges of the form eji in H is at least A/2 for every i. Since I is a “no” instance of
PARTITION and each aj is a multiple of 3, Ai A/2 + 3 for every i. Then, define a flow f
in H as follows: for each i = 1, . . . , k and j = 1, . . . , p such that eji is present in H , route
aj
Ai
(
A
2
+ k + 1
k
)
units of flow along the unique s–t path containing eji . Since Ai A/2 + 3 for every i and
k  1, the latency of every edge of the form eji in H is zero with respect to f . The flow f
is at Nash equilibrium and proves that L(H) = n/2, see Fig. 7(b). 
As in Corollary 3.4, the matching upper and lower bounds of Theorems 4.2 and 4.8
have strong negative consequences for the problem of detecting Braess’s Paradox. Defin-
ing an instance (G, r, ) with general latency functions and n vertices to be paradox-free
if L(G, r, )  L(H, r, ) for all subgraphs H of G and paradox-ridden if for some sub-
graph H of G, L(G, r, ) = n/2 ·L(H, r, ), we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.9. Given an instance (G, r, ) with general latency functions that is paradox-
free or paradox-ridden, it is NP-hard to decide whether or not (G, r, ) is paradox-ridden.
Remark 4.10. We will obtain a hardness result that is similar but incomparable to Theo-
rem 4.8 as a consequence of our work in the next section. See Corollary 5.7 and Remark 5.8
for details.
5. Extensions
In this section, we aim to show that the strong hardness results of Sections 3 and 4 extend
beyond the particular classes of linear and general latency functions, and seem intrinsic
to the problem of designing networks for selfish users. In Subsection 5.1 we consider a
natural extension of the linear latency setting, where all latency functions are polynomials
with bounded degree and non-negative coefficients. In Subsection 5.2, we generalize our
results still further.
5.1. Polynomials of bounded degree
As in Section 3, we begin by observing that existing work bounding the worst-case inef-
ficiency of flows at Nash equilibrium yields an upper bound on the performance guarantee
of the trivial algorithm. The following result is due to Roughgarden [91].
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latency function has the form (x) = apxp + ap−1xp−1 + · · · + a0, with ai  0 for each i.
If f ∗ is a feasible flow and f is a flow at Nash equilibrium for (G, r, ), then
C(f )
(
1 − p · (p + 1)−(p+1)/p)−1 ·C(f ∗).
Example 4.1 and a back-of-the-envelope calculation show that the upper bound in
Proposition 5.1 cannot be improved.
We will say that an instance with latency functions as in Proposition 5.1 has poly-
nomial latency functions of degree p, with the understanding that all coefficients are
non-negative. We will call the corresponding network design problem POLYNOMIAL(p)
LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN. For clarity, we will work with the following asymptotic
form of Proposition 5.1.
Corollary 5.2. There is a constant c1 > 0 such that for every p  2 and every instance
(G, r, ) with polynomial latency functions of degree p that admits a Nash flow f and a
feasible flow f ∗,
C(f ) c1
p
lnp
·C(f ∗).
As in Corollary 3.2, we immediately obtain an upper bound on the performance guar-
antee of the trivial algorithm.
Corollary 5.3. There is a constant c1 > 0 such that, for every p  2, the trivial algorithm
is a c1 plnp -approximation algorithm for POLYNOMIAL(p) LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN.
We next work toward a proof of a matching hardness result. As in Section 4, we first
give a family of networks on which the trivial algorithm performs poorly, and then describe
how to obtain a general inapproximability result.
Proposition 5.4. There is a constant c2 > 0 such that, for every integer p  2, there is
an instance (G, r, ) with polynomial latency functions of degree p for which the trivial
algorithm produces a solution with value at least c2 plnp times that of an optimal solution.
Proof. We will again make use of the Braess graphs of Subsection 4.2. In the proof of
Proposition 4.4, we exploited the fact that general latency functions can be arbitrarily steep
to construct a bad example for the trivial algorithm. Here, we will adapt the previous argu-
ment as best we can, given that only low-degree polynomials are at our disposal.
For each integer p  2, we will define a parameter k and a set of latency functions
k for the edges of Bk . We will choose the parameter k later. The functions k are iden-
tical to those in Subsection 4.2, except that for every i ∈ {1,2, . . . , k}, the type C edges
(s, vk−i+1) and (wi, t) are given the latency function k(x) = ixp . Next, consider the
instance (Bk, k, k) and define paths P1, . . . ,Pk and Q1, . . . ,Qk+1 as in the proof of
Proposition 4.4. On one hand, routing one unit of flow on each of P1, . . . ,Pk yields a
flow at Nash equilibrium for (Bk, k, k) showing that L(Bk, k, k) = k + 1, as in Fig. 6(a).
942 T. Roughgarden / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 72 (2006) 922–953On the other hand, if H is the subgraph obtained from Bk by deleting all edges of the form
(vi,wi), routing k/(k + 1) units of flow on each of Q1, . . . ,Qk+1 yields a flow at Nash
equilibrium for (H, k, k) showing that
L
(
H,k, k
)= 1 + k( k
k + 1
)p
 1 + ke−p/(k+1),
as in Fig. 6(b). Putting k =  p2 lnp  − 1 we obtain L(H,k, k)  2 and L(Bk, k, k) =
 p2 lnp . Since p  2 was arbitrary, the proof is complete. 
Remark 5.5. In the proof of Proposition 5.4, we have avoided optimizing constants for the
sake of readability. We will continue to make this tradeoff in the rest of the paper.
Finally, we extend our lower bound on the performance guarantee of the trivial algo-
rithm to an inapproximability result. This task is more difficult than in Section 4, as a
crucial part of the proof of Theorem 4.8 leveraged the fact that general latency functions
can model edge capacities. This is not entirely possible with low-degree polynomials, and
we are forced instead to adapt the arguments of Section 3 to larger Braess graphs. In par-
ticular, our reduction is from the 2 DIRECTED DISJOINT PATHS problem rather than from
PARTITION. In essence, restricting the allowable latency functions forces us to encode the
intractability of an NP-hard problem into the network topology of a network design in-
stance rather than into the edge latency functions.
Theorem 5.6. Assuming P = NP , there is a constant c3 > 0 such that for every p  2,
there is no c3 plnp -approximation algorithm for POLYNOMIAL(p) LATENCY NETWORK
DESIGN.
Proof. Define k by
k =
⌊
p
16 lnp
⌋
− 1. (6)
We can assume that p is sufficiently large, and hence k  1. We will show that a (k/6)-
approximation algorithm for POLYNOMIAL(p) LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN enables us
to differentiate between “yes” and “no” instances of the 2 DIRECTED DISJOINT PATHS
(2DDP) problem in polynomial time.
Let I = {G,s1, s2, t1, t2} be an instance of 2DDP. We will construct an instance of
POLYNOMIAL(p) LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN (G′, k, ) as follows; see also Fig. 8.
The graph G′ comprises k copies of G, that we will call G1, . . . ,Gk . We will denote the
copy of si and ti in Gj by sji and t
j
i , respectively. Next, we add auxiliary vertices s, t ,
v1, . . . , vk−1, and w1, . . . ,wk−1. The edge set of G′ is as follows:
• each Gi inherits the edge set of G;
• for i = 1, . . . , k− 1, we include edges from s to vi , from vi to si1 and si+12 , from t i1 and
t i+12 to wi , and from wi to t ;
• we include edges (s, s1), (s, sk), (t1, t), and (tk, t).2 1 2 1
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We define latency functions on the edges of G′ as follows:
(A) for edges of the form (vi, si+12 ) or (t i1,wi), put (x) = 1;
(B) for edges (s, sk1 ) and (t12 , t), put (x) = 2 + (1 + 1k )pxp;
(C) for (s, s12 ) and (tk1 , t), put (x) = 1 + k( 4(k+1)4k+1 )pxp;
(D) for i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and edges (s, vk−i ) and (wi, t), put (x) = i( 4(k+1)4k+1 )pxp;
(E) for edges of the form (vi, si1) or (t i+12 ,wi), put (x) = 2 + (2 + 2k )pxp;(F) for edges in G1, . . . ,Gk , put (x) = 0.
The instance (G′, k, ) can be constructed from I in polynomial time.
Next, we claim that if I is a “yes” instance of 2DDP, then there is a subgraph H of
G′ with L(H,k, ) 5. To see why, let P ∗1 and P ∗2 denote vertex-disjoint s1–t1 and s2–t2
paths in G, respectively. Deleting all edges in G′ that lie in some copy of G but not on (the
corresponding copy of) either P ∗1 or P ∗2 , we obtain a subgraph H of G′ that is the union of
2k distinct s–t paths. Let f be the flow that routes k/(k + 1) units of flow on both the path
containing s12 and t
1
2 and on the path containing s
k
1 and t
k
1 , and k/2(k + 1) units of flow on
each of the other 2k − 2 paths. Since each type D edge lies in two paths of the latter type,
all edges incident to s or t carry k/(k + 1) units of flow. Somewhat analogous to Fig. 6(b),
f is at Nash equilibrium for (H, k, ) and proves that
L(H,k, ) = 4 + k
(
4(k + 1)
4k + 1
k
k + 1
)p
= 4 + k
(
1 − 1
4k + 1
)p
 4 + ke−p/(4k+1)  5,
where the last inequality follows from (6).
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graphs H of G′. We will prove this in two steps. First, we will show that unless H contains
most of the edges in G′, capacity considerations in the spirit of the proof of Theorem 4.8
imply that L(H) is large. Second, we will show that if H contains most of the edges in G′,
then the flow at Nash equilibrium in H is similar to the bad Nash flow of Proposition 5.4,
again showing that L(H) is large.
We first claim that if a subgraph H omits a type A or type C edge of G′, then L(H) k.
We will prove this claim for an edge of the form (vi, si+12 ). The argument for an edge of the
form (t i1,wi) is symmetric, and the argument for type C edges is both similar and easier.
To prove this claim, we first observe that many edges of H are essentially capacitated,
in the following sense. We assert that if a flow f causes one of the following three events,
then the corresponding edge e has latency at least p:
(1) fe  8k+18(k+1) for a type B edge e;
(2) fe  2k+12(k+1) for an edge e of type C or type D;
(3) fe  4k+18(k+1) for a type E edge e.
For example, using (6) we can derive(
4(k + 1)
4k + 1
2k + 1
2(k + 1)
)p
=
(
1 + 1
4k + 1
)p
>
[
e1/(8k+2)
]p = ep/(8k+2)  p,
which proves the assertion for events of type (2). The calculations for the other two types
of events are similar, so we omit them.
Now assume that the edge (vi, si+12 ) is absent from the subgraph H or G′. Then, every
flow feasible for (H, k, ) must either route at most (4k + 1)/8(k + 1) units of flow on
the edge (s, vi), or else must cause event (3) to occur with the other edge leaving vi , the
type E edge (vi, si1). We claim if at most (4k + 1)/8(k + 1) units of flow are routed on the
edge (s, vi), then event (1) or event (2) must occur with some edge incident to s. For if not,
edges incident to s carry at most
(k − 1) 2k + 1
2(k + 1) +
4k + 1
8(k + 1) +
8k + 1
8(k + 1) =
8k2 + 8k − 2
8(k + 1) < k (7)
units of flow. The first term on the left-hand side of (7) is for edges of type C or type D
other than the edge (s, vi), the second term is for the edge (s, vi), and the third term is for
the type B edge (s, sk1 ). Inequality (7) provides a contradiction, since a flow feasible for
(H, k, ) must route k units of flow out of the source s. Since a Nash flow for (H, k, )
must cause some event of the form (1), (2), or (3) to occur, L(H) p  k.
We now consider the remaining case and make use of our hypothesis that I is a “no”
instance of 2DDP. Let H be a subgraph of G, and f a Nash flow for (H, k, ). By our
earlier arguments, L(H)  k unless f routes flow on all type A and type C edges. If f
routes flow on all type A and type C edges, the construction of G′ ensures that for all
i ∈ {1,2, . . . , k}, the vertices si2 and t i1 lie on s–t paths in H . Since I is a “no instance,”
for each i ∈ {1,2, . . . , k} there must then be an s–t path Pi containing both si and t i2 1
T. Roughgarden / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 72 (2006) 922–953 945(see Fig. 2). Routing (4k+1)/4(k+1) units of flow on each path Pi defines a flow at Nash
equilibrium for (H, r, ), where
r = k(4k + 1)
4(k + 1) < k.
As in Proposition 5.4, this flow shows that L(H, r, ) = k + 3. By Proposition 2.8, we then
have L(H,k, ) k + 3.
We have exhausted all possible cases, and the proof is complete. 
We now fulfill a promise made in Remark 4.10.
Corollary 5.7. Assuming P = NP , for every  > 0 there is no O(n1−)-approximation
algorithm for GENERAL LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN.
Proof. Fix  > 0, and choose a positive integer m 1/. Let I = {G,s1, s2, t1, t2} be an
instance of 2DDP. Let q be the number of vertices of G. We can assume that G has no
parallel arcs [44], and hence the size of I is polynomial in q .
Next, we mimic the reduction in the proof of Theorem 5.6, setting the parameter k in the
construction to qm. We also set the parameter p = Θ(qm logq) accordingly. The reduction
creates an instance (G′, k, ), where G′ has n = qm+1 + 2qm vertices and the functions
 are polynomials with degree at most p and coefficients of moderate size. Since m is
fixed, the instance (G′, k, ) can be constructed in time polynomial in q . The construc-
tion also ensures that if I is a “yes” instance of 2DDP, then there is a subgraph H of G′
with L(H,k, )  5, while if I is a “no” instance then L(H,k, )  cqm for some con-
stant c > 0 and all subgraphs H of G′. Since G′ has O(qm+1) vertices, this precludes an
o(n1−1/(m+1))-approximation algorithm for GENERAL LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN, as-
suming P = NP . Since 1/(m+ 1) <  and  > 0 was arbitrary, the corollary follows. 
Remark 5.8. Corollary 5.7 is inferior to Theorem 4.8 in an obvious sense: it proves
a weaker lower bound on the performance guarantee for GENERAL LATENCY NETWORK
DESIGN that is achievable by polynomial-time algorithms. On the other hand, Corol-
lary 5.7 is superior to Theorem 4.8 in two respects. First, it applies to an easier problem,
in which graphs are restricted to be simple (without parallel edges), and latency functions
can only be polynomials with non-negative coefficients. Second, the reduction in the proof
of Corollary 5.7 is from the strongly NP-complete problem 2DDP, while the reduction in
the proof of Theorem 4.8 is from the weakly NP-complete problem PARTITION. See Garey
and Johnson [49] for details on this distinction.
5.2. Further extensions
In this subsection we accumulate further evidence that the intractability of design-
ing networks for selfish users is not sensitive to the allowable latency functions. Before
introducing the final set of latency functions that we will consider, we note that identify-
ing a large set of latency functions that behave better than general ones is a non-trivial
task. For example, one natural idea is to require that network latency functions possess
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stance (G, r, ) with Ck latency functions—latency functions that are k times continuously
differentiable—can be “scaled down” to an instance (G, r, 1
M
) in which the first k deriv-
atives of all edge latency functions are as small as desired, by taking M sufficiently large.
Moreover, the network design problem on the scaled instance is equivalent to that on the
original instance. Theorem 4.8 has therefore not been avoided, and for every  > 0, no
(n/2 − )-approximation algorithm exists for such instances, assuming P = NP .
We thus require some “scale-invariant” parameter ensuring that a latency function will
behave better than an arbitrary one. Toward this end, for an instance (G, r, ) and an edge
e of G, define the quantity Γe(x) by
Γe(x) =
{
x·e(x)∫ x
0 e(y) dy
if e(x) > 0 and x > 0,
1 otherwise.
Since every latency function e is non-decreasing, Γe(x)  1 for all e ∈ E and x  0.
Define Γ (G, r, ) by
Γ (G, r, ) = max
e∈E supx∈[0,r]
Γe(x).
For example, the Γ -value of an instance with polynomial latency functions of degree k is
at most k + 1.
These bizarre definitions are justified by the next result, due to Roughgarden and Tardos
[94], which bounds the inefficiency of a flow at Nash equilibrium in an instance (G, r, )
by Γ (G, r, ).
Proposition 5.9. [94] Suppose f and f ∗ are Nash and feasible flows, respectively, for an
instance (G, r, ). Then,
C(f ) Γ (G, r, ) ·C(f ∗).
Proposition 5.9 follows from the discussion following Proposition 2.3, which asserts
that Nash flows are the optima of a certain convex program [13], and the fact that the
objective function of this convex program differs from the cost by at most a Γ (G, r, )
factor. We refer the reader to [94] for details.
While Proposition 5.9 is not as strong as Propositions 3.1 and 5.1 in the special case
of networks with polynomial latency functions, it yields non-trivial upper bounds on the
worst-case inefficiency of Nash flows for a broad spectrum of latency functions. As usual,
we obtain an upper bound on the performance guarantee of the trivial algorithm as a corol-
lary.
Corollary 5.10. The trivial algorithm is a γ -approximation algorithm for network design
instances (G, r, ) satisfying Γ (G, r, ) γ .
Up to a constant factor, the upper bound in Corollary 5.10 is the best possible.
Proposition 5.11. For every γ  1, there is an instance (G, r, ) with Γ (G, r, )  γ for
which the trivial algorithm produces a solution with value γ /2 times that of an optimal
solution.
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modifications. First, the parameter k, which controls the size of the underlying Braess
graph, is set to γ . Second, the latency functions for the type C edges (s, vk−i+1) and
(wi, t) are changed from ixp to the function that is equal to i/γ on [0, γ /(γ + 1)], and is
linear on [γ /(γ + 1),1], subject to g(γ /(γ + 1)) = i/γ and g(1) = i.
Moreover, we can extend the lower bound on the approximation ratio of the trivial
algorithm to an inapproximability result.
Theorem 5.12. There is a constant c > 0 such that for all γ  1, there is no (c · γ )-
approximation algorithm for network design for instances (G, r, ) with Γ (G, r, )  γ ,
unless P = NP .
The proof of Theorem 5.12 is similar that of Theorem 5.6—in fact, a bit easier, due to
the greater flexibility available for defining latency functions. We omit further details.
6. Future work
In this concluding section, we will briefly mention some open questions motivated by
our work. While there are recent studies of other network design games [5,40], we will
limit ourselves to the model studied in this paper.
6.1. Characterizing Braess’s Paradox
In this paper, we have shown that detecting Braess’s Paradox is a computationally
intractable problem. As discussed in the Introduction, however, this problem seems to be-
come easier when latency functions are not part of the input. To be more precise, call a
directed graph G vulnerable if it is possible to designate two of its vertices as a source and
a destination so that, for some traffic rate r and latency functions , there is a subgraph H
of G with
L(G, r, ) > L(H, r, ). (8)
Vulnerable graphs are therefore the ones susceptible to Braess’s Paradox.
Open Question 1. Characterize the vulnerable graphs.
Milchtaich [77] recently solved Open Question 1 for undirected graphs, thereby confirming
an unproven assertion made by Murchland [78].
Replacing the right-hand side of (8) by c · L(H, r, ) we obtain the obvious definition
of a c-vulnerable graph. We urge solvers of Open Question 1 to extend their results in the
following way.
Open Question 2. For all c 1, characterize the c-vulnerable graphs.
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In this paper, we have only studied single-commodity networks, where all traffic shares
the same source and destination. The traffic model described in this paper extends ef-
fortlessly to networks with multiple sources and sinks; details can be found in [94], for
example. How severe can Braess’s Paradox be in multi-commodity networks? We believe
that the following is the most interesting formulation of this question.
Open Question 3. How much can removing edges from a multi-commodity network de-
crease the latency of all of the traffic?
To be clear, suppose (G, r, ) is a multi-commodity instance. Multi-commodity ana-
logues of Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 enable us to define Li(G, r, ) as the common latency
encountered by traffic traveling from the ith source to the ith destination in a Nash flow
for (G, r, ). Open Question 3 asks how large the gap
min
i
Li(G, r, )
Li(H, r, )
(9)
can be for a subgraph H of a multi-commodity instance (G, r, ), as a function of the
number of vertices, edges, or commodities of (G, r, ). No upper bound and no lower
bound better than n − 1, where n is the number of vertices of G, follow from this work.
Open Question 3 was first posed by Weitz [111].
Very recently, Tardos and Walkover [105] proved an upper bound on (9) for multi-
commodity networks that is exponential in the number of edges and in the number of
commodities. While Lin [71] recently devised new multi-commodity versions of Braess’s
Paradox, these do not improve upon the lower bound of n − 1 for (9). See Lin et al. [73]
for the most recent results on this problem.
6.3. A general reduction
In this paper, we considered four different sets of allowable edge latency functions. For
each of the four, we proved optimal or near-optimal upper and lower bounds on the approx-
imability of the corresponding network design problem. We used similar proof techniques
in the four different cases, and this motivates our final open question.
Open Question 4. Is there a generic, unifying proof of all of the results in this paper?
To illustrate what we mean in Open Question 4, we will return to Proposition 5.1, where
we stated a tight upper bound on how much the cost of a Nash flow can exceed that of
an arbitrary feasible flow in a network with polynomial latency functions. Proposition 5.1
is a special case of a much more general result that was proved in [91], which informally
states the following: Given any set of allowable edge latency functions L, the network
with latency functions in L that is “closest” to Example 4.1 is a worst-possible example.
This is a generic reduction from the problem of finding a worst-case network for a set L of
allowable latency functions to what is usually a tractable, back-of-the-envelope calculation.
T. Roughgarden / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 72 (2006) 922–953 949There are also other examples of such generic reductions that are parameterized by the set
of allowable edge latency functions [28,29,90]. Is there also one that determines a tight
bound on the approximability of the network design problem induced by a given set of
allowable latency functions? We expect that a generic inapproximability result will be the
biggest obstacle to resolving this question.
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